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A DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING MODEL 
FOR STRATEGIC MATERIALS 
Franklin R. Shupp * 
IT becomes immediately apparent in analyz- 
ing any national economy that some re- 
sources are scarce not only in the economic 
sense, but also in the more popular interpreta- 
tion of that word. Because of international 
trade these shortages frequently impose no 
great hardship on the "have not" nation; for 
example, the absence of tea and coffee planta- 
tions in the United States does not prevent 
Americans from consuming prodigious quan- 
tities of these beverages. However, in the event 
of an hostility these resource scarcities can 
create a serious problem, especially if they 
happen to include some of the so-called stra- 
tegic materials. It is with these materials, 
which are both vital to the country's defense 
and in short domestic supply, that this paper 
is concerned. 
Some of the more publicized scarce re- 
sources which have been regarded as critical by 
the United States include: tin, uranium, man- 
ganese, rubber, quinine, diamonds, and pos- 
sibly plants manufacturing heavy machinery 
and precision instruments.' The very hetero- 
geneity of this group augurs strongly against 
finding a single solution or even a unique mode 
of attack to the problem of how best to assure 
an adequate supply of these resources under all 
political conditions. Nevertheless, while the 
details of any possible solution may vary enor- 
mously with the individual material, almost 
without exception the available policy measures 
can be fitted into one of the following cate- 
gories: 
1. Importation under all conditions 




These classes of policy measures are gener- 
ally regarded as alternatives, but only infre- 
quently is one pursued to the exclusion of the 
others. Generally, a considerable degree of 
interdependence exists among alternative 
measures and occasionally even among the 
various strategic materials themselves. Fur- 
thermore, within each category a large number 
of decisions must also be made before a policy 
can be formulated. For example, should a con- 
voy with destroyer escort be employed or 
should an airlift be used? What is the optimal 
size of the stockpile? Do we invest in butene 
or butydiene rubber or both? 
Both the interdependence and the complex- 
ity of the strategic materials problem suggest 
that some tools of operations research might 
prove useful in its analysis. However, the un- 
certainty in the political forecasts so domin- 
ates the problem that it virtually precludes the 
use of "linear" programming, especially if a 
quadratic objective function is also necessary. 
Nor is the problem amenable to analysis by 
game theory, since the major objective of any 
potential aggressor would be to win the war not 
merely to disrupt the flow of strategic materi- 
als.2 On the other hand, if one is willing to 
accept a modicum of aggregation, dynamic 
programming can be applied quite effectively, 
and it is a model using this technique which is 
presented here. 
* This research was undertaken while the author was 
associated with the Princeton Econometric Research Pro- 
gram and supported by a contract with the Office of Naval 
Research Nonr-1858 (02). The author benefited greatly 
from the criticisms and suggestions of Oskar Morgenstern, 
Harlan Mills, Stuart Dreyfus, Herman Karreman, and 
other members of the Program. All errors are the author's 
responsibility. 
1These last two items are included because subsidies in 
the forms of high protective tariffs, quotas, and govern- 
ment contracts at bids substantially in excess of foreign 
offers have been granted on precisely these grounds, i.e., 
their strategic importance. 
[90 1 
2 This should not be construed to mean that the poten- 
tial antagonist may not try to impede critical material flows 
as part of his over-all objective of winning the battle. On 
the other hand, if the stockpiled material is a potentially 
effective deterrent, e.g., hydrogen bombs, the whole com- 
plexion of the problem changes. The object then is to 
prevent an hostility, not to insure access to strategic mate- 
rials. This new problem is beyond the scope of this paper, 
and perhaps is not at all amenable to any sort of quantita- 
tive analysis since it involves evaluating the cost of a war. 
A PROGRAMMING MODEL FOR STRATEGIC MATERIALS 91 
In order to both facilitate the exposition and 
to give some specificity to the argument a single 
mineral, manganese, is used to illustrate the 
model. Manganese qualifies as a strategic ma- 
terial since it is (1) in short domestic supply 
and (2) is vital in any war effort. With regards 
to the first criterion it is sufficient to observe 
that during the last decade despite the stimulus 
provided by huge government subsidies, U.S. 
production of commercial grade manganese ore 
averaged only 10 per cent of the annual con- 
sumption of roughly 2,000,000 tons. On the 
second count we note that manganese is an 
indispensable ingredient in the steel making 
process, where it is added in the form of a ferro 
or silico manganese alloy to impart both hard- 
ness and ductility to the finished steel. 
As implied earlier there is no strategic ma- 
terials problem unless some hostility either 
exists or is expected with some positive prob- 
ability within the planning horizon. Fortu- 
nately, this does not necessitate a detailed fore- 
cast of the complex political milieu of the world 
for the planning period. Only those movements 
which cause significant changes in the demand 
for and the nondomestic supply of the strategic 
material under study need be forecast. In the 
case of manganese, the demand is a derived one 
and is contingent on the level of steel produc- 
tion which in turn fluctuates with the prevail- 
ing political climate.3 Three possible political 
states, peace, cold war, and hot war, are here 
considered to have significant effects on the 
level of steel production and therefore on man- 
ganese demand. The supply side of the prob- 
lem can be summarized by observing the exist- 
ence of only four manganese producing regions. 
These are: U.S.S.R., India, West Africa, and 
South America. The accessibility of these ores 
to the United States in any year yields the 
supply constraint for manganese. Like the 
demand function, this is also dependent on the 
prevailing political situation. 
In the next section the political forecast and 
the five policy measures as they impinge on 
the manganese situation are outlined in some 
detail. In the following section a model em- 
bracing the main characteristics of the problem 
is constructed, and in the concluding section 
results of the model are analyzed. 
I. The Manganese Problem 
As indicated above the supply of and the 
demand for manganese are related to the pre- 
vailing political conditions, and therefore, a 
forecast of these conditions for the entire plan- 
ning horizon is essential. The length of this 
planning horizon has been arbitrarily chosen 
as ten years. We assume that only three pos- 
sible levels of hostility, i) peace, ii) cold war, 
iii) hot war,4 determine the demand, and four 
possible sources of manganese ore, a) U.S.S.R., 
India, West Africa, and South America, b) all 
except Russia, c) West Africa and South Amer- 
ica, d) South America, yield the supply con- 
straints. From these twelve demand-supply 
combinations are obtained; some of these sets 
are clearly impossible, for example (i-d), while 
others are extremely improbable, for example, 
(iii-a). Eliminating pairs in this manner re- 
duces the number of feasible political states 
from twelve to five. These five sets are given 
in Table 1. 
TABLE 1. -DEMAND AND SUPPLY CONSTRAINTS 
FOR MANGANESE ORE 
(Net tons manganese metal) 
Political States Demand Supply Constraints 
Yi i-a 800,000 1,600,000 
Y2 ii-b 1,000,000 1,200,000 
Y3 ii-c 1,000,000 800,000 
Y4 iii-b 1,200,000 1,200,000 
Ys iii-d 1,200,000 600,000 
The forecast of these five states for each year 
of the planning horizon given by the probabili- 
ty vector S = {S1, S2, S3, S4, s5} determines both 
the demand for and nondomestic availability of 
manganese. The strategic materials problem 
consists of meeting these demands from current 
s Although steel production also fluctuates with the 
general level of business activity, no provision for these 
fluctuations is made in our model. However, since only 
sizable discrete variations in demand are permitted in the 
model, the above restriction is not too severe. 
4The hot war assumed here is one of attrition. Other 
types of war negate the whole concept of strategic mate- 
rials. The assumption does not imply that an all out 
hydrogen bomb war is impossible or even unlikely; only 
that in that event any strategic materials policy for manga- 
nese is useless. Paradoxical as it may seem, a quick hydro- 
gen war is quite similar to peace from the strategic materials 
viewpoint. 
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nondomestic supplies and from other sources 
at the minimum cost consistent with the welfare 
of friendly nations. Before discussing these 
other sources let us consider some possible 
methods of introducing the political forecast. 
Three methods are discussed in this paper and 
these are somewhat arbitrarily labeled deter- 
ministic, Markovian, and "tree forecast." 
Since we shall be concerned with the varying 
conclusions resulting from using each of these 
three techniques, a paragraph describing each 
seems in order. 
All of these forecasts mechanisms can be 
implemented by introducing a transition matrix 
Q whose elements are transition probabilities 
defined as: 
qij(t) = P(yj(t+l) IYi(t)) 
i.e., if state yi prevails in year t, then the prob- 
ability that state yj will prevail in year t + 1 
is equal to qij(t). If these transitions probabili- 
ties are time independent, as in our Markovian 
forecast, then the subscript t is usually dropped. 
It follows then from the definition that 
St+1 = QSt. 
In the deterministic case we assume that the 
prevailing political states, yi's, are known with 
certainty for each of the years in the planning 
horizon. (This need not imply clairvoyance 
since this "certainty" can be interpreted as 
either the most likely political situation or a 
weighted mean of a probabilistic forecast.) 
Certainty dictates that in each period only one 
of the elements of the probability vector S is 
positive (and equal to 1); this can be achieved 
for succeeding periods by introducing only one 
positive element in the transition matrix Q. 
The position of this unit element will vary over 
time in order to introduce in proper sequence 
each of the political states of the forecast. The 
deterministic forecast used in this study is 
shown by the solid line in Chart 1. 
The transition matrix for the Markovian case 
is time independent and is given by the follow- 
ing matrix which very roughly characterizes the 
situation of the last fifty years. 
.7 .2 .1 0 O? 
1.1 .6 .2 .1 O? 
Q= 1.1 .2 .4 .1 .2 
1.4 0 0 .4 .2 
1.5 0 0 .2 .31 
The matrix is completely ergodic and con- 
verges to an S vector, {.39, .28, .16, .10, .07}. 
These are the steady state probabilities for the 
respective political states {Yi, Y2, Y3, Y4, Y5}. 
Since it seemed unrealistic to assume that the 
prevailing political climate was not known with 
certainty for the initial period, state Y2 was 
selected as the initial prevailing state for all 
computations. As a consequence instead of 
having steady-state properties throughout the 
planning horizon, the forecast exhibited tran- 
sient behavior during the first five periods, after 
which nearly complete convergence obtained. 
The "tree forecast" is a modified branch 
analysis similar to that shown in Chart 1, and 
requires that the transition matrix change from 
period to period. Furthermore, if the contin- 
uity of each projection (branch) is to be pre- 
served, expansion of the matrix is necessary 
during those three periods when two or more 
projections meet, e.g., period 3. Alternatively, 
if continuity is not felt to be important a 5 x 5 
transition matrix suffices.5 
The forecast in Chart 1 has some interesting 
properties. Projection E not only is the most 
likely path, but it is also the weighted mean of 
all five paths.6 It is this projection that is used 
for the deterministic forecast. Also over the 
ten year planning horizon, the average time 
in each of the five states is approximately equal 
to that obtained in the Markovian forecast with 
an initial political situation given by Y2. 
We must still explore the available alterna- 
tive policy measures before we can begin to 
construct a model. The first of these, which 
we have called "import under all conditions," 
is generally the most economical in either peace 
time or for a short hydrogen war. Under other 
political conditions it may not only be very 
expensive, but even impossible since severe 
limitations may be placed on the quantity of 
ore than can be imported. For example, it has 
been estimated that losses due to German sub- 
marine activity in World War II increased the 
5 Since a computer of very limited memory capacity was 
used for these calculations, this latter procedure was fol- 
lowed. 
'Due to the limited number of possible political states 
the strange bunching during period 5 and 6 was necessitated 
if the mean path was also to be the modal path. This is a 
desirable characteristic for subsequent analysis. 
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CHART 1. -POSSIBLE POLITICAL PROJECTIONS AND THEIR PROBABILITIES 
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price of manganese ore by tenfold.7 Also prior 
to 1950 as much as 50 per cent of all manga- 
nese imports came from the U.S.S.R.; today 
none does. It follows immediately then that 
both the costs of and the constraints imposed 
on this alternative are largely a function of the 
prevailing political climate. 
Subsidized domestic production is another 
possible policy which has been employed with 
mixed success. A 100 per cent import duty 
promulgated in 1922 did succeed in increasing 
domestic production to 17 per cent of consump- 
tion in 1925, but only one year later with the 
protective tariff still intact production reverted 
to 7 per cent. More recently the government 
has paid domestic producers two to three times 
the import price for ores to be stockpiled. Even 
these guaranteed high prices failed to raise 
domestic production above 15 per cent of cur- 
rent consumption. At the same time these 
policies virtually depleted all high grade ore 
reserves in the United States. Federally fin- 
anced research projects to develop methods 
for beneficiating low grade domestic ores have 
been inore successful. Several processes have 
proven to be technologically feasible in proto- 
type sized plants, but none are competitive with 
imported ores. 
Stockpiling needs little elaboration. The 
U.S. government has stockpiled approximately 
6,000,000 tons of high grade foreign ore (a 
three-year supply) costing over $250,000,000 
and some 1,750,000 tons of assorted quality 
domestic ores costing close to $100,000,000. 
The bulk of this stockpile was accumulated in 
the early 1950's during which time the c.i.f. 
Eastern Seaboard price increased more than 
50 per cent. 
A fourth policy to be considered is the sub- 
stitution of manganese by some other mate- 
rial(s). The addition of manganese alloys in 
steel manufacturing accounts for approximately 
97 per cent of all manganese consumed, and no 
other known alloy can impart both hardness 
and ductility to steel and at the same time 
serve as a scavenger to combine with sulphur. 
Titanium and molybdenum have been consid- 
ered but neither do both jobs effectively. Fur- 
thermore, the supply of these metals is almost 
microscopic in relation to the quantities needed 
for this purpose, and they cost five to ten times 
as much as manganese alloys. Also during an 
emergency there exists a tendency to substitute 
manganese itself for nickel and chrome yielding 
on balance a zero or possible negative substi- 
tution. 
The final category, conservation, is primar- 
ily a function of changes in steel practices and 
steel specifications. A thorough investigation 
by the American Iron and Steel Institute in 
C. B. Larson, internal paper, General Services Adminis- 
tration. 
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1949 indicated that savings of more than 5 
per cent in either of these areas could not be 
realistically anticipated.8 During the Korean 
conflict most steel makers implemented a pro- 
gram of increased ladle additions of alloy 
(cutting back furnace additions) to conserve 
manganese. This proved effective and the con- 
tinuance of this program virtually precludes 
the possibility of further significant reductions. 
A technique for reclaiming manganese from 
steel slags has also been developed, but has 
proven uneconomical. Finally, it is quite un- 
likely that appreciable changes in steel specifi- 
cations will be made by the Department of 
Defense in time of an emergency. 
II. The Model 
The manganese problem outlined in the pre- 
ceding section can be incorporated in a dy- 
namic programming model, the objective func- 
tion of which minimizes the cost of securing 
adequate quantities of manganese to meet in- 
dustrial demands. Essential to this model is a 
recursive relationship which utilizes the Mar- 
kovian-like property that an optimal decision 
for a given state of the system is independent 
of how that state was reached. The state of the 
system itself can be characterized by one or 
more state variables, the level of which is 
usually influenced by activities in preceding 
periods, but which can be autonomously given. 
It is this latter type of state variable that is 
used to introduce the uncertain political fore- 
cast into our model. 
The functional equation which illustrates 
both the recursive relationship of the cost func- 
tion and the technique for incorporating a 
probabilistic forecast is given by: 
fn-1(x,yJ) =Min [R(x,yj,p) 
pep 
5 
+ , 1 qij fn (xp',yj) 
Assuming that the planning horizon has N 
periods then: 
fh- (X,yi) = total expected cost from the begin- 
ning of period n - 1 to the end of the planning 
horizon given that the current state of the 
system is prescribed by the endogenous state 
variable x (e.g., the level of the stockpile) and 
the exogenous state variable yi (e.g., the pre- 
vailing political climate). 
R (x,yi,p) = the cost in period n - 1 of pur- 
suing a particular policy p from a finite set of 
feasible policies P given the system described 
by (x,yi). 
xp' = the resulting state of the system at the be- 
ginning of period n given that policy p was 
employed in period n - 1. 
The above equation can be solved for all 
combinations of the set of permissable values 
of x and y in the period N - 1, and then itera- 
tively until the first period of the planning 
horizon is reached.9 The necessity of a numeri- 
cal approach as opposed to the analytic tech- 
niques of the Arrow-Harris-Marschak model 10 
and its variants, is imposed by the complexity 
of the manganese problem. More specifically 
as can be seen in the succeeding model we note 
that: 
1. There is more than one endogenous state 
variable, x, and furthermore one of these in- 
volves both nonrecurring capital investment 
costs and a time lag. Time lags are normally 
handled by backlogging orders but this is ruin- 
ous in a war situation. 
2. The set of feasible policies P is determined 
by five unrelated constraints which could not 
be incorporated into a single criterion function. 
3. The demand forecast is not visualized as 
being time invariant. This is partially a con- 
sequence of the necessarily short planning 
horizon. 
The complete manganese model can be writ- 
ten in functional equation form as:11 
fn (Xs,Xr,Xd,y) = Min[ 1.OOz, + ci (zc + zs) 
+ 21.54zd + (24.00 + 24.60z,) zc 
+ 59.14Axd + 8 X {qij fn+1(x8 
j=1 
+ Zs - Zs, Xr - Zd, Xd + AXd, Yj) } 
8American Iron and Steel Institute, Problems Involved 
in the Conservation of Manganese (New York, 1949), 5. 
9 An authoritative discussion of the computational as- 
pects of dynamic programming can be found in R. Bellman 
[1], 85-90. 
10 Kenneth Arrow, Theodore Harris, and Jacob Marshak 
"Optimal Inventory Policy," Econometrica, 19 (July 1951), 
250-272. 
" All costs are given in millions of dollars and each unit 
of x or z corresponds to the equivalent of 200,000 net tons 
of manganese metal. 
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for i - (1,2, . . 5) 
subject to 
Zs ? Xs 
Zd min [Xd,Xr] 
zC + Zs </3 
Z, + Z8 + Zd + Zc ? 
ci z. + 59.14 Axd? 125 12 
where 
x8 = 0, 1, . . . 15 = level of stockpile 
xr = 0, 1, . . . 40 = size of domestic reserves 13 
Xd= 0, 1, . . . 4 = capacity of domestic bene- 
ficiating facilities, Axd ? 0 
yi for i = (1, . . . 5) = prevailing political state 
zc = o, 1 . . . = quantity of manganese im- 
ported for consumption 
Zs= 0, 1 . . . quantity of manganese im- 
ported for stockpiling 
z8- 0, 1 . . . = quantity of manganese with- 
drawn from stockpile 
z0 = , 1 . . . = quantity of manganese pro- 
duced domestically 
Zc- 0, 1 . . . = quantity of manganese deficit 
(obtained via conservation and substitution 
techniques) 
qij = transition probabilities 
8 = discount factor 
pi import constraint given state i (Values 
given in Table 1) 
yi demand given state i (Values given in Table 
1) 
Cii import cost given the prevailing political 
situation, yi 
cii = 18.65 + 1.51zx 
C2= 17.65 + 1.76zi 
Ci3 = 15.67 + 2.88zx 
c = 28.09 + 1.76zx 
cZ5 = 37.41 + 9.00zi 
A few comments on these and other costs 
may be in order. The import costs have been 
calculated from time series data of f.o.b. prices 
for each of the four major producing regions 
over the period 1947-1957. These data were 
deflated and a simple regression run to obtain 
the price elasticity. For states y4 and y5 during 
which an hostility is indicated, a war risk in- 
surance premium is included. Since insurance 
is generally limited to the cargo (and not the 
ship) these costs contain a downward bias. 
Both the domestic production operating costs 
(21.54) and capital costs (59.14) are based on 
an engineering study 14 of the Dean-Leute 
beneficiation process, which has been developed 
in a prototype size operation. The cost of ore 
withdrawn from the stockpile (1.00) is large- 
ly a transportation charge estimated by the 
late J. H. Crickett, while the penalty charges 
(24.00 + 24.60z,) are estimated costs of con- 
servation and substitution practices. The 
strongly positive quadratic cost reflects the 
limited quantities of ores which can be obtained 
by either of these two methods. 
By properly manipulating the transition 
probability parameters each of the three types 
of forecasts (deterministic, Markovian, and 
"tree forecast") can be achieved. Using this 
model, optimal policies have been computed 
for each of the three forecast approaches, and 
the results are indicated in the succeeding 
section. 
III. General Characteristics of the Solution 
Using the deterministic forecasting tech- 
nique, optimal policies for each of the five 
paths (A, B, C, D, E) of Chart 1 were calcu- 
lated, and as anticipated substantial differences 
in the level of activities (z), state variables 
(x), and costs obtained for the various fore- 
casts. To find a single best policy for all five 
paths, the payoff matrix given in Table 2 was 
constructed using the optimal policies for each 
of these forecasts as strategies and each fore- 
cast as a possible event. The events (forecasts) 
were assigned probabilities equal to those 
shown in Chart 1. 
Of the five possible policies the C optimal 
policy yielded the minimum expected cost 
while the B optimal policy would be selected if 
the maximum criterion were employed. Both 
of these policies differ widely with respect to 
the level of domestic processing facilities con- 
structed and/or the size of the stockpile to be 
accumulated from those values given by the E 
optimal policy (that of the weighted mean 
12 In the actual computations the first term in this con- 
straint was eliminated. The assumption being that while 
Congress might limit annual funds for producing high cost 
beneficiating facilities, they would be freer with funds to 
purchase stockpiled goods which might later be resold. 
Obviously the model could be solved as written. 
"3Since in this instance this constraint is never binding 
it was eliminated from the computations thus reducing the 
dimensionality of the problem to 400 = (16 X 5 X 5). 
" Singmaster and Breyer, An Appraisal of Processes for 
Recovery of Manganese From Basic Open Hearth Slags 
(New York, 1955). 
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TABLE 2. -PAYOFF MATRIX FOR FIvE 
SELECTED STRATEGIES a 
Events and Their Probabilities 
Strategies Forecast Forecast Forecast Forecast Forecast 
A B C D E 
A Optimal 
Policy 1,148.7 1,507.1 1,300.5 1,573.3 1,194.0 
B Optimal 
Policy 1,277.9 1,238.9 1,290.3 1,350.9 1,238.4 
C Optimal 
Policy 1,260.0 1,380.3 1,131.5 1,389.4 1,185.8 
D Optimal 
Policy 1,254.4 1,455.3 1,220.1 1,269.3 1,185.8 
E Optimal 
Policy 1,191.9 1,531.5 1,211.3 1,355.8 1,075.6 
a Costs are in millions of dollars. 
path). These differences are shown in Table 
3 and clearly demonstrate the shortcomings of 
using a weighted mean forecast.15 
Although the C optimal policy yields the 
minimum expected cost of those five strategies 
considered, it may not be the best possible 
policy for the uncertain future given by Chart 
TABLE 3.- COMPARISON OF POLICIES USING 
DIFFERENT DECISION CRITERIA 
Best Policies a 
Change In Weighted Expected Cost Maximin 
State Variable Mean Forecast (Bayes) (Wald) 
(E optimal) (C optimal) (B optimal) 
Increase in 
Stockpile Level 
lst year 0 0 0 
2nd year 0 400,000 0 
Domestic Beneficiating 
Capacity Built 
1st year 200,000 400,000 400,000 
2nd year 0 0 0 
Expected 
Cost $1,232,000,000 $1,228,000,000 $1,263,000,000 
a Values are net tons of manganese metal content. 
1 for two reasons. First, since there are liter- 
ally thousands of other possible strategies it is 
quite possible that a number of these would be 
less costly than the C optimal policy. Secondly, 
since each of the five strategies is an optimal 
policy for a deterministic forecast, it consists 
of a single sequence of decisions to be pursued 
irrespective of the prevailing political climate."6 
But, given the uncertain political forecast 
which confronts us, we would expect that a 
more flexible policy (strategy), in which the 
decision is based on new information acquired 
as the political future unfolds, would result in 
a lower expected cost. 
This second point forces us to distinguish 
between an optimal policy under certainty and 
one under uncertainty. In the former case an 
optimal policy consists of a single sequence of 
decisions, while in the latter case it consists of 
a large number of possible alternative sequences 
of decisions, which indicate for each period 
what decisions are to be made once the current 
prevailing political situation is known. This is 
shown in Table 4 which indicates the optimal 
TABLE 4. - OPTIMAL POLICIES AND EXPECTED COSTS 
FOR THE MARKOVIAN FORECAST 
Policy (Activity Level)a 
0 ~~ ~~0 u 
Period - E 
and E an a Expected 
State V C 1: CI Cost b 
1-Y2 10 0 0 0 0 4 1123 
2-yi 4 4 0 0 0 0 791 
2-Y2 6 4 0 0 0 0 875 
2-y3 6 4 0 0 2 0 924 
2-y4 8 4 0 0 0 0 977 
2-y5 6 4 2 0 0 0 1055 
a Values are in 100,000 net tons manganese metal contained in 
ore, and millions of dollars. 
b Costs are in millions of dollars. 
policy for the first two of eleven periods using 
the Markovian forecast approach and the 
transition matrix given in Section I. 
Since the political climate in period 1 is 
assumed to be known with certainty, a single 
set of decisions for that period suffices. How- 
ever, since an uncertain period 2 is postulated, 
a different set of decisions is indicated for each 
prevailing state in that period. Table 5 pre- 
sents the results obtained by using the "tree 
forecast" mechanism outlined in Section I. It 
differs from the results of the Markovian tech- 
nique since two periods are assumed to be 
known with certainty. Note also that a small 
15 In fact, because the weighted mean forecast is also 
the most likely forecast, the difference between the expected 
costs of the C and E optimal policies is only $4,000,000. 
16 Obvious modifications of these decisions were per- 
mitted in our calculations. E. g., if optimal policy A calls 
for importing more ore than forecast C requires for con- 
sumption, the excess can be transferred to the stockpile. 
Conversely, if consumption demands exceeds imports and 
domestic production, stockpile withdrawals are permitted. 
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TABLE 5. OPTIMAL POLICIES AND EXPECTED COSTS 
FOR THE 'TREE FORECAST" 
Policy (Activity Levels) a 
>s 
Cd 
Period o 0. X a a 
and 0 o 4 '  o Expected 
State ~ U 414 a 5 CZ i: V u X Q Costs b 
1-Ya 10 0 0 0 0 4 1162 
2-y2 6 4 0 0 2 0 924.2 
3-yr 2 4 0 2 0 0 704.6 
3-Y2 4 4 0 2 0 0 768.3 
3-y3 6 4 0 0 2 4 945.5 
3-y4 6 4 0 2 0 0 863.3 
a Values are in 100,000 net tons manganese metal contained in 
ore, and millions of dollars. 
b Costs are in millions of dollars. 
stockpile (200,000 net tons) is accumulated in 
this second period. 
Since the "tree" forecasting technique yields 
a political forecast almost identical to that 
given in Chart 1, (and therefore, also to that 
of our payoff matrix), it is interesting to com- 
pare the above costs and policies with those 
indicated by the Bayes criterion in Table 3. 
During the first two periods, the two policies 
are similar except for the smaller stockpile 
accumulation in the "tree forecast" policy. 
However, an expected savings of $66,000,000 
is obtained by pursuing the more flexible sto- 
chastic ("tree") policy. 
The numerical approach used in the pre- 
ceding computations spews out considerable 
quantities of data similar to that shown in 
Table 6. Simple decision rules can be easily 
derived by noting that movement across a row 
indicates the imputed value of a stockpile and 
down a column the imputed value of domestic 
beneficiation capacity. 
Suppose, for example, we are in state Y2 
with no stockpile and no beneficiating capacity. 
In this situation the imputed value of a 400,000 
net ton stockpile is $1123 - $1063 or $60 (mil- 
lion). Likewise the imputed value of a 400,000 
net ton capacity beneficiating plant equals 
$1123 - $975 or $148 (million). If the mar- 
ginal cost of acquiring a 400,000 net tons of 
manganese is less than $60,000,000 a stockpile 
of this size should be accumulated, and if a 
plant with 400,000 net ton capacity can be 
constructed for less than $148,000,000 it should 
be built. 
Using the proper coefficients from our model 
(Ci2) and noting that manganese for stockpiling 
is purchased after ore for consumption, the 
marginal cost is calculated at $77,540,000. 
Since this exceeds $60,000,000 this quantity of 
manganese should not be stockpiled. Likewise, 
we can calculate the capital cost of construct- 
ing a 400,000 net ton capacity plant, which is 
2(59.14) = $118,280,000. Since this is less 
than $148,000,000 the plant should be built. 
(These results are consistent with those given 
in the first row of Table 4.) 
If we always think in terms of a ten year 
planning horizon, similar decision rules can be 
TABLE 6. - SELECTED COST DATA a FROM THE PRINT 
OUT SHEET OF THE MARKOVIAN FORECAST MODEL 
(Millions of dollars) 
Domestic Level of Stockpile 
Capacity (100,000 net tons manganese metal as ore) 
Political (100,000 net tons 
Situation manganese metal) 0 4 8 12 16 20 
Yi 0 1012 956 903 853 802 753 
4 877 829 783 740 699 661 
8 832 803 781 768 764 765 
Y2 0 1123 1063 1006 949 894 842 
4 975 919 866 817 770 726 
8 900 859 821 793 776 770 
Y3 0 1200 1106 1036 972 913 855 
4 1019 950 885 828 777 729 
8 914 864 826 795 777 770 
y4 0 1209 1178 1097 1022 953 890 
4 1091 1010 935 867 804 747 
8 961 894 838 802 781 771 
Ya 0 1522 1265 1122 1020 940 873 
4 1178 1036 933 853 789 734 
8 986 884 829 796 777 769 
a Values are the expected costs of pursuing an optimal policy over 
the entire ten year planning horizon given the initial state variables 
indicated by the positon of the cost figure in the table. 
derived merely by noting our current location 
in Table 6 and proceeding as above. A some- 
what more complicated method for deriving 
decision rules must be employed when the re- 
sults of the "tree forecast" model are used. In 
this event, the current period is just as impor- 
tant as the level of the current state variables, 
since the transition probabilities are not as- 
sumed to be time invariant. Consequently, a 
new table for each period is necessary. 
The emphasis in this paper has been on the 
techniques employed and very little has been 
said concerning policy implications. This is as 
it should be since all results are based on a 
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hypothetical forecast of the political future. 
Furthermore, the model did not take into ac- 
count such factors as start-up troubles, which 
frequently plague a new operation such as the 
domestic beneficiation process. Nevertheless, 
it seems reasonable to infer that the govern- 
ment stockpile of both domestic and foreign 
ores containing almost 3,500,000 net tons of 
manganese metal greatly exceeds those levels 
which could be justified on purely economic 
grounds, since the largest stockpile indicated 
by any of our stochastic forecasts is 400,000 
net tons and even the most pessimistic deter- 
ministic forecast (projection B) calls for a 
maximum stockpile of 1,200,000 net tons of 
metal. 
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